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By now we all are familiar with the litany of cases which refused to find elevated 
scrutiny for so-called “affirmative” or “social” rights such as education, welfare or 
housing: Lindsey v. Normet,1 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,2 Dandridge v. 
Williams,3 DeShaney v. Winnebago County.4  There didn’t seem to be anything in 
minimum scrutiny which could protect such facts as education or housing, from 
government action.  However, unobtrusively and over the years, the Supreme Court has 
clarified and articulated one aspect of minimum scrutiny which holds promise for 
vindicating facts.  You will recall that under minimum scrutiny government’s action is 
sustained if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.  That has seemed 
hopelessly vague.  However, through a series of cases the Supreme Court has now made 
it clear that the three prongs of the test—rationality, relationship and government—are 
questions of fact for the trier of fact.  This opens up the possibility that civil discovery 
can show, with respect to criteria for these prongs, that government fails to meet 
minimum scrutiny.  Actually, the tendency of the Court’s minimum scrutiny 
jurisprudence is to severely disfavor discretion, and strongly favor factual showing, in 
minimum scrutiny adjudication.  The eminent domain decision, Kelo v. New London,5
surprised everyone by being a 5-4 decision, when most commentators felt the case would 
amount to no more than a reaffirmation of discretion with respect to eminent domain, and 
for that reason vindicate government by a large margin.  Actually, Kelo is something like 
a penultimate step of the Court in articulating its new jurisprudence of factual analysis 
with respect to minimum scrutiny. 
The important thing about Kelo, as we shall see, is that although it applies the new 
criteria to eminent domain, the gravamen of the Court’s complaint is that government has 
not been making factual showings under minimum scrutiny.  That’s what the Court feels, 
has gotten seriously out of hand.  Minimum scrutiny is not a blank check or a free pass.  
That means that it is not a blank check when minimum scrutiny is used to justify 
government action with respect to taxation, housing, regulation, liberty, health care, 
welfare, or anything else.  In this new minimum scrutiny jurisprudence, for example, 
educators may find themselves asking strange questions about a government’s action 
with respect to education which they don’t like.  For example, did government substitute 
a private purpose for a government purpose in the education action?  Housing advocates 
may find themselves issuing subpoenas to find out whether, with respect to a government 
housing policy, government lied?  In connection with a health policy, did government 
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2conceal documents or transfer personnel?  These are all questions the Supreme Court 
now invites in litigating minimum scrutiny with regard to government action as it relates 
to any fact.  The prehistory of the new minimum scrutiny criteria, is briefly told because 
there isn’t much to tell: until the Court decided to become more active, there were very 
meager criteria.  More detailed criteria have only appeared recently.
From Hawaii Housing Authority to Virginia
 Until meaningful changes in eminent domain law give property owners a better 
chance to fight eminent domain proceedings, the old minimum scrutiny for eminent 
domain—reaffirmed in Kelo v. New London—remains.  That standard allows eminent 
domain use if the use is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.  That 
sounds as though virtually anything would qualify.  Is there anything concrete in it which 
would give property owners a way to fight back?  There is.  It is the phrase “government 
purpose.”
Prior to Kelo, the Supreme Court had said, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, that the government purpose need only be “conceivable”6—apparently 
something the Court could conclude retrospectively.  This raised the question, whether 
there need in fact be a government purpose?  
From Virginia to Kelo
The Court answered this, prior to Kelo, in Virginia v. United States.  In Virginia, 
the Court found that there must be a very high level of proof to justify gender 
discrimination in public education.  In discussing government purpose, the Court said that 
the government purpose “must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in 
response to litigation.”7  There must in fact be a government purpose , and it is concluded 
prospectively, not retrospectively.
This was a very important clarification and it seems to have gone unnoticed.  The 
idea is not mentioned in the two cases the Court cites for the proposition.8
From Kelo to New Minimum Scrutiny Litigation
In his Kelo concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy articulated for the first time, the 
detailed factual criteria for government purpose by laying out a whole program of civil 
discovery for litigants to follow.  In it, he synthesized, under the concept of “primary,” 
the twin aspects of government purpose, factual and prospective.  Private parties are 
evaluated by the place they hold in the chronology, not the role they play in the 
development.  That is, the goal of discovery is establish the chronology, because the 
distinction between public purpose and private purpose turns on the chronology.  He 
wrote: “A court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to 
private parties should [conduct]….a careful and extensive inquiry into “whether, in fact, 
the development plan [chronology]
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3[1.]  is of primary benefit to . . . the developer…, and private businesses which may 
eventually locate in the plan area…, 
[2.]   and in that regard, only of incidental benefit to the city….[,]”
and whether the chronology shows
“[3.]  awareness of…depressed economic condition and evidence corroborating the 
validity of this concern…,
[4.]  the substantial commitment of public funds…before most of the private beneficiaries 
were known…,
[5.]  evidence that [government] reviewed a variety of development plans…[,]
[6.]  [government] chose a private developer from a group of applicants rather than 
picking out a particular transferee beforehand and…
[7.]  other private beneficiaries of the project [were]…unknown [to government] because 
the…space proposed to be built [had] not yet been rented….”
These are all prospective criteria; government purpose is shown ab initio, not post hoc.  
And it is shown by facts.  Nor is the “primary” test limited, with respect to discovery, as 
to the earliest date of relevance.  For example, “primary” with respect to “awareness,” 
does not imply a particular starting date; government has the burden of showing what 
facts make up its “awareness.”  These are all criteria subject to depositions, document 
subpoenas, and the usual orders and procedures of civil discovery.  Kennedy added: “The 
trial court concluded, based on these findings, that benefiting Pfizer [a drug company 
interested in locating facilities on the land seized by eminent domain] was not ‘the 
primary motivation or effect of [New London’s] development plan’; instead, ‘the primary 
motivation for [New London] was to take advantage of Pfizer’s presence’….Likewise, 
the trial court concluded that ‘[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that…[New 
London was] motivated by a desire to aid [other] particular private entities….9  Kennedy 
makes it clear that government purpose is an issue of fact for the trier of fact.
Let’s generalize these concerns by looking at them in the context of a health care 
policy.  Does it show a government purpose?  To answer that question, we need facts 
which allow the Court to decide
whether, in fact, the health care purpose chronology
1.  is of primary benefit to another purpose than health care, 
2.   and in that regard, only of incidental benefit to health care,
9 Kelo, slip. op. (Kennedy, J., concurring) at 2-3 (citations omitted).
4and whether the chronology shows
3.  awareness of deficiencies in health care and evidence corroborating the validity of this 
concern,
4.  a substantial government health care policy…before another purpose is known,
5.  evidence that government reviewed a variety of health care policies,
6.  government chose a policy from a range of choices rather than picking out a particular 
policy beforehand and
7.  other policy implications were unknown to government.
In short, the Court is saying that when government cannot show a health care purpose, it 
fails to show a government purpose.  Now let’s go back to eminent domain and see just 
how sordid the story can become using discovery to try to meet the criteria.  And 
remember, this is the sort of trail any litigator may be obliged to follow in order to 
vindicate a client against government’s invocation of minimum scrutiny.
From New Scrutiny Minimum Scrutiny Litigation to New Constitutional Rights
The factual distinction between public and private purpose is well known in 
political science, as capture theory, in which private purpose with respect to certain facts, 
is substituted for government purpose with respect to those facts.  Purpose as fact, is not 
at all the issue.  What the Court wants to know is, whose purpose? And it wants a factual 
showing on that issue.10  It is highly ironic, therefore, that in the true facts of Kelo—
which came out after the Court decided the case—it was learned that New London had 
had a private purpose after all.  The true chronology didn’t meet a single one of Justice 
Kennedy’s criteria.  New London had simply lied to the Court.  New London had argued 
the following chronology to the Supreme Court:
1.  New London decided, based on a factual inquiry, that it wanted to revitalize;
2.  New London announced its desire;
10 See Peter Kulick, “Rolling the Dice: Determining Public Use in Order to Effectuate a ‘Public-Private’ 
Taking—A Proposal to Redefine ‘Public Use,’” http: //ssrn.com/abstract=262585; Jim Rossi, “Moving 
Public Law Out of the Deference Trap in Regulated Industries,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=657202; Joel S. 
Hellman et al., “Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition,” 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=240555; Irina Slinko et al., “Laws for Sale: An Empirical Study of the Effects of 
Regulatory Capture,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=402840.  For a larger context, see Michael W. Klein, “Risk, 
Taxpayers, and the Role of Government in Project Finance,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=620626; John T. 
Cuddington, “Analyzing the Sustainability of Fiscal Deficits in Developing Countries,” 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=597231.  The “capture” phenomenon is also well-known under the name “iron 
triangle,” the substituting of private for public purpose involving three actors: legislators, bureaucrats and 
constituencies.  See Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy (Harpercollins 1984).
53.  Pfizer Corporation heard about it and approached New London with a plan.
4.  New London accepted Pfizer’s plan.
That was not, in fact, what had happened:
In mid-July [2004, after the Supreme Court had decided to hear the Kelo case, which it decided in 
June of 2005], as commentators and politicians around the country decried [New London’s] 
attempt to seize private homes for economic development on the Fort Trumbull peninsula, a press 
release appeared on the Web site of Pfizer Inc.  The pharmaceutical company, whose $300 
million research complex sits adjacent to what remains of the neighborhood, announced that it 
wanted to set the record straight on its involvement in the Fort Trumbull development project.  
The project, the statement said, wasn’t Pfizer’s idea.  “We at Pfizer have been dismayed to see 
false and misleading claims appear in the media that suggest Pfizer is somehow involved in this 
matter,” the statement said.  The writers said the company “has no requirements nor interest in the 
development of the land that is the subject of the case.”  But a recent, months-long review of state 
records and correspondence from 1997 and 1998—when officials from the administration of 
then-Gov. John G. Rowland were helping convince the pharmaceutical giant to build in New 
London—shows that statement is misleading, at best.  In fact, the company has been intimately 
involved in the project since its inception, consulting with state and city officials about the plans 
for the peninsula and helping to shape the vision of how the faded neighborhood might eventually 
be transformed into a complex of high-end housing and office space, anchored by a luxury hotel.  
The records—obtained by The Day through the state Freedom of Information Act—show that, at 
least as early as the fall of 1997, Pfizer executives and state economic development officials were 
discussing the company’s plans, not just for a new research facility but for the surrounding 
neighborhood as well.  And, after several requests, the state Department of Economic and 
Community Development [DECD] produced a document that both the state and Pfizer had at first 
said did not exist: a 1997 sketch, prepared by CUH2A, Pfizer’s design firm for its new facility.  
Labeled as a “vision statement,” it suggested various ways the existing neighborhood and nearby 
vacant Navy facility could be replaced with a “high end residential district,” offices and retail 
businesses, expanded parking and a marina.  Those interactions took place months before Pfizer 
announced that it would build in the city, on the site of the former New London Mills linoleum 
factory, and months before the New London Development Corp. announced its redevelopment 
plans for the neighborhood and the former Naval Undersea Warfare Center next door.  The 
NLDC’s plans, while different in many respects from the hand-drawn 1997 plan, maintain the 
vision statement’s core purpose—a total replacement of the existing stock of modest homes, 
apartment houses and businesses, and the development of upscale housing and office space to jibe 
with the new Pfizer complex.  NLDC and city officials have long characterized their efforts to 
recast the working-class neighborhood as a response to Pfizer’s decision to build on the 
peninsula, rather than a move made as a condition of Pfizer’s involvement in the project.  And in 
the state and federal court rulings that upheld the city’s takings of homes for the private 
development project, judges at every level of the judiciary have assumed the same.  Even in a 
blistering dissent, which warned that the NLDC’s plan left all private property under the “specter 
of condemnation,” U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor sets the beginning of the 
case in February 1998, when Pfizer announced its plans to build its facility.  While challenging 
the constitutionality of the eminent domain project, O’Connor and the other justices accept that it 
was an independent effort to “complement” the construction of a research complex next door.  
But in a series of recent interviews, several former high-ranking state officials confirmed what 
opponents of the project have long insisted and what the company continues to deny: the state’s 
agreement to replace the existing neighborhood was a condition of Pfizer’s move here….Any 
6attempt to clarify the origins of the development project is hindered both by the passage of time 
and by the fact that many of the participants in the earliest discussions with the company will not, 
or cannot talk about their efforts.  Peter N. Ellef, who as DECD commissioner and later [former 
Governor] Rowland’s co-chief of staff oversaw the state’s involvement, is awaiting trial on 
federal corruption charges stemming from his years in the governor’s office….Rowland, who 
publicly embraced this and other urban development projects and poured in state bond funds, sits 
in federal prison in Pennsylvania after pleading guilty to a corruption charge….But some former 
members of the Rowland administration with knowledge of the state’s negotiations with Pfizer, 
speaking on the condition of anonymity because they wished to spare their relationships with 
current and former colleagues, confirmed Pfizer’s involvement in the planning of the Fort 
Trumbull project.  The company’s formal assistance agreements with the state, which lay out 
more than $118 million in financial incentives and other amenities that were offered by the state 
and the city to convince Pfizer to build in New London, does not specifically offer to redevelop 
the neighborhood.  But the redevelopment project, largely paid for with an additional $73 million 
in bonded funds, was an integral part of the state’s deal with Pfizer, the officials said, and the 
company would not have built its headquarters in New London without being assured that the 
surroundings would undergo a radical change.  “They would not have done the deal without the 
commitment to make the surrounding area more livable,” said a high-ranking official who was 
privy to negotiations between Pfizer and the state.  “They were trying to attract people with 
Ph.D.s who make $150,000 to $200,000 a year to eastern Connecticut…and they were not going 
to tell them they had to drive to work through a blighted community….I’m not going to tell you it 
was a difficult decision,” the official said.  “It wasn’t, because of the number of jobs….”But for 
years, executives at Pfizer, along with the state and the NLDC, have disputed that view.  Instead, 
they have maintained that the effort to redevelop the neighborhood came only in response to 
Pfizer’s announcement that it would locate its headquarters here, and they have insisted that the 
company never directed the state or city to overhaul the surrounding area in exchange for that 
construction….In interviews, however, the state officials made clear that the difference between a 
demand by Pfizer and a statement of preference about what it would like to see next door was a 
small one, especially when the city and state had already committed to invest, according to 
figures from the DECD, a total of $118 million in other incentives.  “This wasn’t like convincing 
a bank in Norwalk to move to Stamford,” a former NLDC employee said.  “This was a major 
league deal.  This was 2,000 jobs, et cetera.  They know what that means.  DECD knows what 
that means….What do we need to make this happen?”….In retrospect, the company’s interest in 
the Fort Trumbull project does not seem to have been much of a secret at the state level, where 
the project seems largely to have been treated as part of the package of incentives prepared for 
Pfizer.  For instance, on Dec. 11, 1997, DECD Commissioner James F. Abromaitis wrote…[that 
the state would help] by “defraying the cost of that development and improving its value through 
a comprehensive, state-funded waterfront improvement and development project,” seemingly a 
reference to the Fort Trumbull neighborhood….In the meantime, the NLDC and the city—not the 
state, and not Pfizer—have absorbed the sharpest criticism since the Supreme Court decision 
brought the New London case to the public eye.  And that, one of the state officials said, was no 
accident.  “They have taken all the missile attacks,” the official said, referring to the development 
corporation.  “That’s the beauty of distance.”11
Thus, the true chronology was
1.  New London wanted Pfizer to locate in New London;
11 The Day, October 16, 2005 (New London, Connecticut, archived at www.theday.com).
72.  Pfizer approached New London with its plan;
3.  New London adopted the plan;
4.  New London announced its redevelopment plan.
What is missing in the second chronology?  What is missing is the government purpose.  
There is only Pfizer’s purpose.  Private purpose has been substituted for government 
purpose, and so the development plan fails (should have failed) minimum scrutiny.
Now that the scam has been revealed in the famous Kelo case, litigants are turning 
to the government purpose prong of minimum scrutiny, in order to save their property.  
One lawsuit in New Jersey directly invokes Justice Kennedy’s criteria: “In his Kelo
concurrence, Justice Kennedy commented that the evidence showed that New London, 
‘reviewed a variety of development plans and chose a private developer from a group of 
applicants rather than picking out a particular transferee beforehand.’  Plaintiffs contend 
that did not happen here.  Long Branch [New Jersey city government] promised the area 
to the [private development business] principals before the [private development 
business] was even created, and then everything—the designation of the area in need of 
redevelopment, the creation of [the private development business], the designation of [the 
private development business] as the developer, the passing of the Ordinance authorizing 
eminent domain—all were implemented to seal the deal.”  Indeed, this action reaches 
back into the actions of the principals, pointing out their acquisition of properties and 
running them down purposely, in order to provide the government finding of “blight” 
which was legally necessary to proclaim a plan for redevelopment and the invoking of the 
eminent domain power.12
The Emerging Realignment of Prongs of the Minimum Scrutiny Text
The Kelo Court accepted that private purpose can play a role in eminent domain 
use, finding that “[t]here is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic 
development from the other public purposes that we have recognized.”13  However, that 
camouflaged the proper distinction to be made, between government and private purpose, 
for which there is a principled way to distinguish.  The true facts in Kelo also shed light 
on another criteria which Justice Kennedy did not mention: deception.  Does government 
lie about the chronology?  If it did, that undermines its credibility when it comes to all the 
other criteria, since all the other establish chronology.
Finally, lying about the chronology undermines another prong of minimum 
scrutiny which government might claim it meets in its attempt to use eminent domain: 
rational.  There is nothing rational about the lie.  This, in turn, sheds light on the third 
prong: relates.  That is also a question of fact for the trier of fact.  What government does 
is not assumed to be rational: that is something government must prove.  “Relates” means 
interrelates.  Government must show that its chronology is internally consistent.  New 
London understood the legal test for government purpose perfectly well.  It understood 
perfectly well that each prong of minimum scrutiny—rational, relate, government—is a 
12
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8question of fact for the trier of fact.  It knew it had to conceal what it had done, or the 
Court would not have allowed it to use eminent domain.  Discovery may also reveal that 
the developers also understand that the government purpose test is a factual test, and that 
they need to help government to show that there was no substitution of private purpose 
for public purpose.  This raises the possibility of civil conspiracy charges as well as 
lawsuits brought under the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).  So 
documents are shredded, people are transferred, memories fail.  In these cases, revealing 
the chronology is exactly what must be done to stop eminent domain uses if there is no 
law which will stop them, and given the idiotically vague ‘reforms’ which have been 
proposed, litigation will more and more turn on establishing the facts with respect to the 
government purpose test.  Chronology will turn out to be hugely important in these 
cases.  If the true chronology in New London had been known—instead of the lying 
chronology presented by New London—Susette Kelo would have won her case.  Enough 
said.  More importantly, none of these new criteria and alignments, are specific to 
eminent domain.  Rather, they reflect the Court’s increasing concern that government 
increasingly tries to push facts out of government.  This means that the Court is 
increasingly receptive to all facts which seek to integrate themselves into minimum 
scrutiny.  This is about-face from the days when the Court said it was not interested in 
elevating facts above minimum scrutiny.  It is an invitation for litigants to obtain what 
they want, with respect to those facts, simply by using civil discovery in connection with 
minimum scrutiny.  Because it is there to be used.
